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THE ROLE OF PEASANT ORGANISATIONS IN THE JAPANESE LAND REFORM 
Gerrit Huizer 
Different kinds of peasant organisations and movements have existed in 
Japan in the past oenturieso Most speotaoular were the spontaneous revolts 
of peasants in partioular areas where for· some reason land tenanoy 
conditions became unbearable. Thus, in one of the villages in the valley 
north of Matsumoto, Nagano Prefecture, a riot broke out in 1125. The 
reason was' that because of a particularly bad agricultural year the tenants 
had no produoe to pay the tax in kind; and no food for their own 
sUbsistence,. They asked the landlords to buy food for them and pay the 
taxes (as an advance), but the latter refused to do so. In one village, 
out of desperation, about 500 tenants then stormed the, houses and warehouses 
of the landlords and destroyed them. The tenants of this village at the far 
end of the valley started to marohtowards the local capital Matsumoto; on 
their way, many other villages joined them, similarly storming the landlords' 
properties. ,'Some landlords tried in vain to organise their tenants to 
combat the growing stream of rioting peasants, about 30,000 of whom were 
finally marching towards Matsumoto. Only the mediatory efforts and 
persuasion, by one highly respeoted land-owning family made the ten,ants lose 
some of their motivation, while the appearanoe of a great many sa.murai 
(warriors) from Matsumoto Castle, threatening to use their guns, m,ade them 
finaliy return to their homese' Neither tenants nor landlords were killed 
. 1 
in the movement. This was one example of movements that sometimes ooourreao 
B,etween 1600 and ,the end of the Tokugawa regime in 1868, about 3,000 
peasant riots ocourred, mostly in waves in periods of famine. 2 As a result 
of the Meiji Restoration and the introduotion after 1870 of a western type 
of private land-ownership in rural areas, the oontrast between a new olass 
1. Oral history colleoted during interviews with peasant leaders in Ohmaohi, 
Nagano Prefeoture. 
2. M.H.Koh~ohiro Takahashi, "Mouvements paysans et problemes agraires au 
Japon de la fin du 18me si901e a nos jours" , Enquete sur Mouvements Paysans 
et Problemes Agraires de la Fin du 18me Sieole a Nos Jours, Commission 
Internationale d'Histoire des Mouvements Sooiaux et des Struotures Sooiales, 
mimeo., pp. 3-8. 
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of landlords (jinushi) and tenants (ko13aku) increased, resulting-in more 
protest movements. Protest was also directed against government policies 
of the :r:1Ieijiperio,d, such as conscription, the new land taxes and the 
. imposed 'administrative reorganisation in the rural areas. The changes 
introduced under the Meiji regime were on the whole disadvantageous to the 
peasants, who continued to live under conditions similar to those existing 
under th~ feudal system predominant before the Tokugawa regime fell in 1868. 
Official policies and certain groups of landlords later started to 
be concerned about the tendency towards increasing landlessness as being 
dangerous to social stability. Around 1890 efforts were undertaken to 
regulate tenancy through legislation. Cooperative associations to protect 
small farmers and to maintain a "stable rural society,,3 were initiated; 
from 1891 appropriate cooperative legislation was under oonsideration until 
in 1900 the Industrial Cooperative Law was promulgated (dealing mainly witp. 
Agricultural Cooperatives). A little earlier, in 1899, an Agrioultural 
Association Law had been passed to ore ate .aasociations designed to improve 
agricultural methods. It was noted, however: 
"But none of these. measures sought to tackle agricultural problems by means 
which would be in any way inimi(ntl to the interests of the landle.rds. The 
Agricultural Association Law, in fact, helped to confirm and organise the 
power of the landlords in the villages~ The most that such measures could 
hope to do about the tenancy system was to oheck its spread by strengthening 
the position of the peasant proprietor who still owned his own land and by 
saving him from the indebtedness which might end in its loss. The influence 
of the landlords was at this time sufficiently powerful for there to be no 
question: of4the bureaucracy taking any action detrimental to their interest~." . 
In this period about one-third of the members of the Diet (National Congress) 
directly represented the agrarian landed class. 5 It was more or less in the 
same period that the Public Order Police Law was promulgated (March 1900), 
prohibiting organised action by the workers on the grounds that this would 
constitute a disturbance of public peace. 
The cooperatives were generally a federation of buraku (hamlet) 
organisations. Burakus are olust~rs of 30 to 40 farming households, 
representing extended families. The structure of government administration 
3. IDACA, Agricultural Cooperative Movement in Japan,(Tokyo: The Institute 
for the Development of Agricultural Cooperation in ASia, undated), p. 15. 
4. R.P.Dore,· Land Reform in Japan (Oxford University Press, 1959), po 64. 
5. ~. 
- 2 -
introduced after the Meiji Restoration was designed to control such local 
organisa.tions from aqove. 6 A group of burakus together constituted a 
villa.ge ami. the villages were integrated into prefectures. The na. tional 
government exercised authority over the prefectures and through these down 
to the village and buraku levels. This hierarchy existed in the structure 
of the government administration as well as in the cooperatives and 
agricultural associations. 
"Both types had government stimulation and enco"(,l.ragement, and both were 
made up almost exclusively of landlords. Since there was little horizontal 
aSf:lociatioh among farmer-cultivators -- no sense of unity had developed 
among them -- the landlords, through their mutual associations operating as 
village level organisations, were the bases for prefectural and na.tional 
federations. "7 
The landlords were the leaders at all levels, particularly in the 
buraku. Although often related ·through blood relationShip with other buraku 
, 8 
members, these "bosses" felt themselves superior to the ordinary farmers. 
As one soholar noted, the general assembly of buraku members was not the 
organ of democratic expression of the members" will, but rather a means 
through which the upper class controlled the group.9 "Free labour for'the 
communi ty", a kind of corvee, was organised by the landlords mainly for 
their own benefit, and fre~uently formed a heavy burden for the less 
privileged members of the buraku. 10 
Although outstanding figures arose almost everywhere, the situation 
in the buraku was complicated by the fact that the dividing line between 
landlords, small farmers and. tenants was generally not clearout. Many 
tenants were part-owners of very small plots and many landlords were 
relatively small, so that they almost approximated a farmer=operator. 
Differenoes were often not very outspoken and the distribution of buraku 
members on the asoribed local status ladder was ~uite gradual. 
Sometimes ohanges tended to uptset or modify the existing system. 
During World War I, in partioular, the landlords benefited eoonomically. 
6. Keiji Kamiya and David E.Lindstrom, Farmers' Or anisations and their 
Role in Community Development in Japan FAO Seminar-cum-Study Tour on 
Farmers' Organisations, Tokyo, November 1963), p. 4. 
7. l!?i!!.., p. 5. 
8. ~. 
9. T.Ushiomi, La Communaute Rurale au Japon (Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de Franoe, 1962), p. 12. 
10 • .illi,., p. 15. 
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J:.,and prices went up and landowners had many opportuni ties for profitable--
specula.tion·, while small farmers lost their lands through indebtedness, 
partly a result of inflationary tend~ncies. Absentee landlordism increased 
and tenant fa~mers were forced to p~ higher rents in kind. This went to 
such an e.xtreme that tenants had insufficient rice for their own survival. 
The result was the last and largest spontaneous peasant revolts called the 
"pre-industrial riots",11 the Rice Riots of 1918 that spread to more t.han 
30 prefectures and lasted 42 days. 
Dnring the First World War, rapidly increasing industrialisation 
gave greater employment opportunities which caused an outflow of people 
from the rural area.s towards industry.12 The bargaining position of urban 
labour and of the peasantry improved somewhat, the i'ormation of labour 
unions accele·rated and also the occurrence of strikes. This reflected on the 
peasantry: 
"Of importance was the increase of labour strikes and union organisations. 
It was .typioal that the younger brother who had .gone to theoi ty to work 
would tell about this when visiting home in the village. Sometimes he would 
use his experience to the advantage in a tenant-Iandlord·dispute. 1I13 
As we have noted, the First World War brought many ohanges to the 
rural areas, mainly favourable to the landlords. However, one effeot of 
industrialisation was an improvement in the tenants' bargaining position. 
Because of the relative labour shortage, they were able to threaten the 
landlords with non-oultivation of the land if they did not get a reduotion 
in rent. Since experiments by the landlords to oUltivate with maohinery 
proved less profitable than the traditional tenant cultivation, they often 
had to give in to these demands. 
The influence of people who had worked in industry was strongly felt 
soon after the war when industry passed through a severe crisis. Many 
workers were dismissed and returned to their already overcrowded villages. 
Tension increased rapidly since the backward oonditions in whioh tenants . 
generally lived were more acutely felt by those who returne.d. The organising 
experienoe·they had gained in industry was soon applied t9 bargaining for 
better tenanoy conditions. 
11. George O.Totten, The Sooial Demooratio Movement in Prewar Ja an (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966 , po 34 ff. 
12. MasaoTakahashi, Modern Japanese Eoonomy sinoe 1868 (Tokyo: Kokusai 
Bunka Shinkokai, 1968), p. 97. 
13. G.Q.Totten, op.oit., p. 36. 
I . 
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The first formally organised tenant unions grew up in the areas 
around the new.industrial centres, particularly Nagoya. The first local 
·tenant organisations were reported around 1916 in the prefectures of 
Aichi, Gifu and Mie, soon to be followed by those of Osaka, Hyogo and 
Okayama, and a few years later in several prefectures of Kyushu, where there 
. 14 
were many former ind.ustrial workers from the eity of Fukuoka. Local unions 
grew generally at the buraku levei, more or less spontaneously, around rent 
disputes. Workers who had been dismissed because of union activities and 
had had to return to their villages were particularly influential in these 
activi ties.· Several of them became effective peasant organisation leaders. 
The need for an organisation at the national and prefectural levels 
was increasingly felt but did not materialise until 1922. The increasing 
acceptance of christian, democratic and socialist ideas by Japanese 
intellec:tuals and the spread of these ideas in many circles helped to 
prepare the ground. Another factor that favoured the rise of large-scale 
organisations representing the peasants' ±nterests was that: 
"On the national level the League of Nations' International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) had a direct influence. While it primarily affected 
labour policy, it also stimulated the agrarian movement since it proclaimed 
the right of tenant farmers to organise in their own interest - an aot 
which had been oonsidered iilegal in Japan but which the Japanese government, 
as a member of the ILO, found it increasingly difficult to deny.,,15 
A group of intellectuals, pressmen, a missionary and a labour 
leader took the initiative in oreating the Japanese Peasant Union (Nihon Nomin 
Kumiai, abbreviated: Nichin6). At the inaugural oonvention on April 9, 
1922 in the. YMCA building in Kobe about 120 persons participated, among 
them the wellknown christian sooialist leaders T.Kagawa and G.Sttgiyama. 
Initially, only 253 peasants were members of Niohin6 while there were some 15 
16 buraku chapters. At .first members of the many existing buraku unions 
affiliated on. a personal basis, but soon affiliation became by groups. tihen 
the Seoond Convention of Niohin6 was held on February 20, 1923 there were 
already 300 affiliated chapters and about 10,000 members. 17 
14. Information supplied by Mr.K.Aoki, a former peasant organisation leader 
who. wrote a 6 volume History of the Japanese Agrarian Movement, Nihon 
Nomin Undo Shi (Tokyo, 1947); see also G.O.Totten, "Labour and Agrarian 
Disputes in Japan Following World War I", Economio Development and 
Cultural Change, Vol. 9, No •. 1, October 1960, pp. 194 andp. 204; and 
R.P.Dore, op.cit., p. 69. 
15. G.O.Totten, The Sooial Democratio Movement in Prewar Japan, op.cit., 
p. 37" 
16. K.Aoki, op.cit., Vol. 3, p. 816 
17. ~., po· 235. 
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-By-1926 tlie-Nioliin6-claimed-acIues=paying membersnip of' about 68,000 
peasants. Its main aim was still to reduce rents but it also had such 
politica.l aims as legislation protecting the tenants and the rather vague 
objective of "socialisation of the land".18 After universal suffrage was 
introduced in Japan in 1925, and the number of voters rose from 3 million 
to 14 mi Ilion, Nichin6 became politically more influential. Nichin6 leaders 
circulated a request to the 28 labour federations with more than 1,000 
members to form together a Horkers and Peasants Party. Increasing 
involvement. in political and ideological issues caused many consecutive 
splits and mergers among peasant organisations and political parties; which 
are difficult to unraveL One divisive point was whether to include all 
peasants and.small landowners or only tenants. Another was between those 
who saw the tenants' struggle against the landlords as a class struggle 
directed toward overall social change, and those who were more in favour 
of compromise and the achievement of concrete benefits. It was observed 
that: 
"These differences were primarily differences between leaders. Which 
national organisation any particular local tenant union w·as federated with 
depended more on personalconnection~ith particular leaders than on 
ideological attachment to one doctrine rather than another. Arid, indeed, 
in their praoticai activities the various federations differed Ii ttle 
from each ·other.. Their chief function was to assist tenants engaged in 
disputes, to encourage the formation of local tenant unions in districts 
hitherto unorganised, and to direct and coordinate the formulation of 
tenants' demands.,,19 
Whatever occurred at the national level, the main funotion of tenant 
unions was at the local level in rent disputes with landlords. Many of 
these disputes had been taken up by buraku unions before the national 
organisation existed, but the struggle at the local level was made more 
effective through the national union and its officials, often intellectuals. 
As we have noted, tenancy disputes started during and·after the 
F'irst World War in areas near the large industrial centres of Nagoya, Osaka 
and Kobe. A Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce report (quoted by Dore as a 
typical example) gives the following genera.l reasons why such tenancy 
disputes appeared and rapidly increased in spite of adverse conditions: 
"The immediate cause was the tenants' demand for rent. reduction, but the 
report enumerates several contributory factors. Many of the landlords 
were non-resident, and, of those \.,ho lived in the district, most led idle 
18. R.P.Dore, op.cit., p. 74. 
19. ~., op.cit.,p. 77. 
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and useless lives showing no 'paternal oare' for their tenants ('in one 
hamlet there are twenty-five landlords who devote themselves zealously to 
the tea -ceremorJ3;, but only two or three who bother to encourage their 
tenants to build compost sheds'); the tenants had come to realize the 
possibilities of collective action, partly as a result of, their military 
experienoe, and after the Rice Riots they were conscious of the wealmess 
of the polioe; the villages were near an ind~strial area and the tenants 
had the possibility, if they were foroed off the land, of falling back on 
a job in the towns; bad feeling ha~ earlier been caused by a landlord's 
attempt to make the tenants bear the cost of certain drainage works and 
reap the profit himself by selling the land; reoent harbour works had 
deprived the tenants of seaweed on whioh they relied as fertilizer and 
henoe added the expense of extra chemical fertilizer to .f·heir burdens; 
landlords refused repeated requests for a replanning of the ineffioient 
drainage system and the building of new field paths, the lack of which was 
a great inconvenienoe in cUltivation. Moreover, ren-hs were high and. the 
landlords were unwilling to make reductions. Theoretically there was a 
custom of orop-sharing in years of bad harvest; in the Tokugawa period 
80 per cent was to go to the landlord and 20 per oent to the tenant, later 
the theoretical proportions had beoome 10 : 30, and from 1912 60 : 40, but 
in practice landlords had never agreed to aooept less than 90 per cent of 
a normal year's rent. 'Since the war,however', says the' report, 'tenants 
have no longer been oontent to give implioit obedienoe to the landlords as 
they had hi therto! • ,,20 
The olimate of inoreased demooratio freedom created in Japan around' 
1925 was particularly favourable to the development of unions in areas 
hitherto untouched by the movement. One faotor was the abrogation in 1925 
of Artioles 11 and 30 of the Public Order Polioe Law whioh had made labour 
aotivities illegal and justified police intervention against organising 
efforts. Also, pressure by the ILO, stimulated by oountries that feared 
Japanese competition because of its very oheap labour, was helPfUl. 21 
Publioity regarding the appalling conditions of tenants, in some 
cases resembling forms of slavery if sons or daughters had to be given to 
servitude or prostitution to enable the parents to pay rent or interest, 
prepared national public opinion and shamed the landlords as a class. 
Another reason why the movement spread widely was the high level of 
literacy among Japanese peasants, even the most isolated being acquainted 
with ocourrences elsewhere in the oountry. In prefeotures suoh as Niigata 
and Nagano, not directly linked with industrial centres, looal leaders 
picked up the idea and started to organise their f9l1ows. 
20. ~., pp. 69-10 from: N8shomucho, Nomukyoku, Kosaku-sogi ni kansuru 
ChoBa, Vol. I (1922), ppo 93-122, and Kyoohoka1, Nosonka, Kosaku-sogiohi 
ni okeru Nason ~ij8 no Henka (1928), ppo 49-61. 
21. G.O.Totten, "Labour and Agrarian Disputes ooe", o;e.oito, po 1920 
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In other prefectures local buraku groups were organised by national 
or prefectural leaders appointed by the Nichin6. Thus, leader K.Aoki was 
nominated first to organise a buraku union in Miyakubo in Chiba prefecture 
and in 1926 was sent as seoretar,y-general to Akita prefeoture to organise 
buraku unions on a large soale. 
The unions in Niigata prefeoture were organised from 1923 onward 
mainly by Y.lshida~ the son of a poor tenant, who later became a national 
leader of the Nichin6. 22 In years of poor harvest, tenants had to borrow 
from moneylenders in order to pay the rent. The news of effeotive tenant 
action elsewhere against exoessive rents in bad years had spread to 
Niigata y and Ishida initiated efforts to copy these aotions in his own 
buraku. The strategy developed by trial and error in oonsultation with some 
of his fellows, reaoting to landlords' opposition to demands for rent 
reduction. Landlords often tried to deal with individual tenants, refusing 
to negotiate with representatives. In reaotion, tenants started to apply 
tactios of "oolleotive bargaining en-masse" to emphasise their demands. 
The tenants of a partioular landlord, generally between 10 and 30, 
would hold a .si t-in in front of hi.s house, sometimes carrying posters to 
denounce him in publico Polioe intervention in favour of the landlords 
was one reason why such aotions had to be organised on a larger Bcale. 
Demonstrations and large lI address meetings" were organised, first secretly 
but later more openly, and large-scale sit-ins around the houses of the 
most prominent landlords, suoh as the president of their looal union. 
Repression was often severe, leaders being jailed" B.nd,·tortured. They were 
acoused of creating disorder, hindering publio servioes, damaging property, 
or other pretexts. Landlords tried to eviot tenants who joined in aotions 
against them, causing the maintenanoe and seourity of tenanoy to become a 
major demand. An inoreasing number of cases were brought before the courts 
but without muoh suocess. 
The risks involved made the leaders . ,~;'-; stand out by their example 
and sacrifioe. Ishida dedioated himself fully to organising activities 
while his wife oultivated his plot. First his own buraku was organised but 
later he visited other burakus in the same or surrounding villages. His 
struggle was particularly hard, Niigata prefeoture being oharaoterised by 
relatively large landholdings by Japanese standards. Six landlords eaoh 
owned more than 1,000 heotares worked by thbus~nds of tenants. Here there 
22. Information supplied by Mr.Yuzen Ishida during several interviews. 
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was no paternalistio atmosphere typioal of most smaller landholdings, where 
a strong personal bond existed between the landlord and his tenants. 
In the oampaign to spread the movement, those burakus were ohosen 
where the most severe and acute problems existed. Great obstacles had to 
be overoome. Very large landowners were helped by police repression; smaller 
landowners used their traditional paternalistic oontrol to pressure tenants 
against Jo~n~ng a uniono Kin relationships9 refreshments, favours and 
threats to foroe people to pay their debts, were used to pressure t~e 
tenants. These obstaoles could only be overoome by the immediate organisation 
of a union. Potential activists (called org) had to be looked for in the 
burakus and a meeting organised with their help. Once a meeting was held it 
was essential to continue it until a union had been effectively oreated by 
the eleotion of a president, vice-president and treasurer, and the payment 
of dues. Sometimes suoh meetings lasted a day and a night or even two days. 
Tenants were made to realise the obstacles that they would have to 
faoe, and also that there would be no improvement should they suocumb. It 
was emphasised that the pressure used by landowaers and polioe showed their 
true character. Muoh attention was given in the discussions to successful 
tenant unions elsewhere in the oountryo The greatest diffioulty was to get 
a first union organised in an area, after which others soon followed. 
Sometimes one union per buraku was formed, later amalgamating in a village 
federation (villages consist of several burakus). Sometimes one union was 
formed for a whole village. Soon 26 buraku units in 7 villages were able to 
form a federation of South Niigatao Later a prefeotural federation for 
Niigata was oreated and Ishida.beoame the head of the "struggle department". 
This ~ederation joined the Niohin6. 
Onoe a strong organisation existed, the struggle beoame more 
effeotive. Landlords took cases to court g defending their olaims to rents 
based on their property rights. In one year there were as many as 600 such 
oases. Since the courts generally favoured the landlords, public opinion 
and looal authorities had to be aroused through demonstrations or similar 
aotions in order to shame or persuade ,.' the landlords into some form of 
oonoession or oompromise. Paychologioal faotors, so imp~rtant in Japan, 
suoh as keeping-up appearanoes, avoiding shame, the desire for peaceful 
settlement rather than open confliot, were thus used by the organisations in 
favour of the tenants. Posters denounoing partioularly abusive landlords or 
their lawyers were sometimes also effeotively utilised. 
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Wh~n the movement had shown its strength in Niigata prefecture, 
Ishida went at times to the neighbouring Nagano prefecture, where contrasts 
were less serious, in order to guide the creation of peasant organisations 
there, or to Yamagata where oonditions prevailed similar to those in 
Niigata (the Homma family had over 1,500 hectares of land). 
In general, action in the villages or burakus was started in two ways. 
People would go to a prefectura.l federation and ask for an advisor to be 
sent to help them solve a problem or to organise a local union. The other 
approach was that leaders at the prefectural level would send one of their 
org people or would personally go to plaoes where the existence of a dispute 
or problem had beoome known through the newspapers or local correspondents. 
The latter approach, initiated from above as one might say, was 
applied in the oreation of unions in Akita prefecture; this was undertaken 
in 1926 by K.Aoki who was sent as secretary-general of the federation of 
Nichin6 in tha~ prefecture. Aoki was a graduate from a hortioultural high 
school but he joined the Nichin6 out of social concern immediately aftar 
graduation. A year later, in 1926, he became secretary of the Tbkyo Niohin6 
offioe; as such, he was sent to the Miyakubo buraku in Chiba prefecture to 
help solve a conflict that had arioen between 40 tenants and their landlord. 
The tenants were not organised, and the landlord had threatened to eviot 
them from the lots they were cultivating sinoe they could not pay the rent. 
Aoki persuaded the tenants topl~ together two of the forty plots spread 
over the area of the buraku, the rest of whioh would remain unCUltivated if 
the landlord carried out his threat. So many peasants worked on each plot 
that they were ready in two days. A meeting was then held in which the need 
for organisation was discussed and a union created. The show of organised 
power impressed the landlord who accepted the demand for exemption from ren'~ 
for that year. This example drew wide attention and was repeated in other 
burakus from where people oame to ask technioal assistanoe. Direot action 
suoh as the en masse planting of paddy fields was followed by a meeting at 
which a union was formed and president, vice-president and treasurer elected. 
Soon, org people ·of the new unions helped their neighbouring burakus without 
needing direot assistance from the Tokyo office. 
One effect of en masse cul ti vation of paddy fields wa.s to impress 
those landlords who liked to maintain the image of being good "fathers" to 
their tenants. This referred particularly to the smaller landlords, the 
really large landowners being more difficult to tackle. 
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Aoki was later nominated secretary-general of the prefectural Nichin6 
federation in Akita arid started to organise unions there. Again, burakus 
with the most serious problems were first approached. Of crucial importance 
when a leader from outside came to offer help to the peasants was to 
establish confidence and "status". This was done in various w~s. Effective 
organisation of action to solve a serious problem, as described above for a 
buraku in Chiba prefecture, was one method. In Akita the approach was 
sometimes used by which a landlord was contacted and dealt with "without 
shbwing an inferiority complex". Peasants were impressed by this and 
prepa.red. to follow such a leader in the creation of a union, backing him 
up if a show of bargaining power was needed in dealings with the landlord. 23 
The fact that a leader needed to prove himself as a ·person able to 
I 
deal with land.loI'ds at an equal level was crucial in the context of 
Japanese rural society, as it is anywhere where patronage relationships 
predominate. Iri many areas in Japan a fictitious father-son, patron-client, 
or prot~ctor-protege relationslrlp (oyabun-kobun) predominated as a means of 
social control and to enforce conformity. This occurred principally in the 
relationship between small landowners and their tenants. 24 The patron 
, , 
(oyabun) went to considerable effort to maintain this system, beneficial to 
him,by:acting as intermediary in the arrangement of marriages (nak6do). 
This imposed obligations on the landlord and gave physical and emotional 
security to the tenant, as long as the latter fulfilled his part of the 
obligations that might include certain forms of corvee when required by the 
landlord. Only a leader who really inspired confidence in the tenants, and 
was able to replace to some extent the emotional security of the oyabun-
kobun relationship through personal charisma, was in a position to create 
a union. 
Aoki proved himself on one occasion by dining ceremoniously at a 
landlord's house without showing signs of inferiority. The tenants followed 
the four-hour ceremony with the aid of the maids and formed a union 
23. Interview· with K.Aoki in Tokyo, 3-6-70. 
24. T.Ushiomi~ op.cit., pp. 56-78; pp. 77-78 noted: "On peut affirmer que 
dans le,s hameaux et villages qui comptaient de gros prop;pietaires avec 
quelques dizaines de chobu (hectares), dont la separation sociale 
d'avec la classe des fermiers etait nettement tranchee, le contrale 
economique a eta tel que la parente fictive n'avait pas de raison 
d' etre. Tout camouflage devenait inutile." 
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Some of the more effective tenant union leaders were themselves 
members of landowning families. For example, Y.Kubota, former socialist 
peasa.nt representative in the Diet (National Congress), during the 1920s 
organised a tenants' union in his home area in Nirayama, Shizuoka prefecture. 
His landowning family had fallen on bad times,but he had been able to study. 
After gra.duating from Tokyo University, he 'became a tea.cher at the 
Agricultural High School in Nirayama and organised the tenants against severe 
opposition. He was punished with army servioe in 1932, later being sent to 
Manchuria as a government offioial. In 1946 he returned to his village where 
he was elected mayor and later national representative. 25 
Many top leaders of Niohin6 were university graduates and, in the 
I 
context of Japanese rural society, this proved an advantage in their work 
as peasant leaders. 26 
The formation of a union generally went through the following stages: 
1. the atmosphere of the buraku was studied and potential local leaders 
discovered who were prepared to stand up to the landlords; 2. meetings were 
held a.t whioh the need for organisation was explained, with examples from 
successful unions elsewhere; 3. the union was organised by the election of 
officials; 4. negotiations were opened with the landlords. Stages 3 and 4 
were interchangeable. Stage 2 could in some cases take months because the 
inner structure of the buraku showed contrasts between traq,itionally-oriented 
leaders and potential new leaders, which could be utilised by the landlords. 
Members were threfore required to take the following pledges. 
1. Never to attempt to obtain tenancy rights of land already cultivated by 
another member by offering a higher rent. 
2. Never to aocept a landlordvs demand to return land without consulting the 
union. 
3. Never to relinguish tenancy rights without informing the union and 
arranging for another member to take over the land. 
25. Interviews with former peasant union leaders and the wife of the late 
Y.Kubota in Nirayama. See also Keiji Kamiya and David E.Lindstrom, 
opocit., pp. 59~62, where Nirayama is described as one of three cases 
of outstanding peasant organisation and community development effort, 
,without emphasising, however, the importanoe of the pre-war politioal 
peasant struggle led by Y.Kubota as a preparation for later developments. 
26. See G.O.Totten, The Sooial Democratic Movement, op.cit., pp. 151-70 for 
listings of the backgrounds of national peasant leaders. 
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4. Never to take over the tenanoy of land from another member without his 
agreement. 
5. On purohasing land at present leased to another member, not to attempt to 
. 27 
terminate the tenanoy for at least a year. 
In order to show bargaining power in negotiations, use was sometimes 
made of publicity and shame-imposing activities: payments of village taxes 
were delayed, sohoolchildren went on strike en masse", rioe oakes oontaining 
pictures of an objeotionable landlord were distributed. These methods beoame 
famous through a dispute in Kisaki (Niigata prefecture). This was 
partioularly speotaoular beoause of the seppuku (shame-imposing form of 
suicide) committed by a leader of the union, and a fight with the police who 
came to evict tenants from invaded plots. Twenty-nine people were arrested. 
The oase drew so much publicity that it formed the starting point for a 
nation-wide campaign for farming rights and security of tenure, a first step 
towards aotion in favIDur of land reform. 
As peasant unions spread through the oountry and beoame better 
organised, the oharaoter of their demands changed.. Initially, demands were 
mostly for postponement or reduction of rent payments in cases of bad 
harvest and emergenoy; later, demands for a permanent rent reduotion of 
30 peroent were inoreasingly heard. 28 The number of disputes also inoreased 
over the years, as shown in Table 1. The way in whioh they were spread over 
the different prefeotures is illustrated by Table 2, whioh olearly shows 
that disputes were initiated in the prefeotures around industrial oentres 
from where they spread to less urbanised areas north of Tokyo where owners 
of large estates were more frequent. 
Landlords increaSingly tried to eviot peasants when they started to 
organise unions. The fact that more and more disputes were brought to the 
courts (rather than solved through negotiation) which generally ruled in 
1'avour of' the landlords, made the peasant organisations more aware of the 
need for politioal aotion at the national level. Radioal views on the need 
1'or drastio SOCial structural change in order to improve the lii'e of the 
peasants found increasingly positive response. The (leftist) Workers' and 
Peasants '. Party, on the whole supported by the Nichin6 (both undergoing 
parallel spli ts and mergers), won oonsiderable inf'luenoe during the 192e 
elections 1'or the Diet. 
27. R.P.Dore, op.cit., p. 73. 
2t3. ~., p. '(e. 
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Table 1. Numbers of Farmer Disputes, Tenants and Landlords Involvedl • Tena~t, Landlord, and Conciliation Unions and Membership, 1917~35 J 
Number Number 
of of 
Number of Tenants Landlords Tenant Unions Landlord Unions Conciliation Unions 
Year Occurrences Involved Involved Number Membership' Number Membership Number Membership 
(thousands) . (thousands) (thousands) 
1917 85 
.1918 256 
1919 326 
1920 408 34,605 5,236 352 
1921 1,680 145,898 33,985 681 192 85 
1922 1,578 125,750 29;0'77 1,114 247 176 
1923 1,917 . 134,503 32, '112 1.534 164 290 24 347 38 
1924 1,532 110,920. 27,223 2,337 235 414 32 542 84 
1925 2,206 134,646 33,001 ~ 307 532 35 1,371 142 1926 2,751 i51,061 -39,705 ,926 347 605 41 1,491 165 
1927 2,052 91,336 24,136 =-4,-!rs2~ 365 734 . 57 1,703 174 
1928 1,866 75,136 19,474 4,353 330 695 56 1,909 190 
1929 2,434 .81,998 23,505 4,156 311l 655 55 1,986 245 
1930 2,478 58,562 14,159 4,208 301 640 53 1,980 
1931 3,419 81,135 23,768 4,414 306 645 51 2,047 255 
1932 3,414 61,499 16,706 4,650 297' 662 50 2,098 259 
1933 4,000 48,073 14,312 4,810 303 686 50 2,309 279 
1934 5,828 121,031 34,035 4,390 276 633 49 2,219 272. 
1935 6,824 65,011 18,057 4,011 242 531 38 1,748 203 3' ". " • 'I J . .' .' ,'/ 9 ,- . / q. 0, Tefl ..... , ,,-CI.-6t;r ~i1d ,4jr~ Jr(dh LJ'";I-IT-c-;-,''' .> ~ __ -5. c:...." :;>P' ...; rj./!~ -tt: A~ 
-Sources: Naikak'll Tokeikyoku, Rode Tokei Yoran, 1932; Ohara Shaka! Mondai Kenkyiijo, Nihon Toke! Nenkan. 
1932-37; R. P .. Dore, Land Reform in Japan. New York, 1959, p. 72. 
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The government, alarmed by the rising tide of' radicalism in the 
peasant and labour movement, ordered nationwide arrests of movement leaders 
in the so-called 3-'15 event (March ,15, 192e). This was a serious blow to 
the Nichin6, most 01' its top leaders at national a:nd some prefectural levels 
being imprisoned. Some, such as national leader TolDlda, remained in jail 
until al'ter vJorld War II. 
One result of the mass arrests was that moderate groups which had 
split with the main organisation and the remaining Nichin6 leadership again 
merged into one large organisation. On May 27, 192e, the National Peasants' 
Union (Zenk0ku Nomin Kumiai, abbreviated: Zenn6) was formed, but soon split 
again into factional divisions. Another mass arre~t of relatively radical 
leaders took place on April 16, 1929 (the 4-16 event), practically destroying 
several oi', the prel'ectural federations of Nichin6 and Zenn6. 29 In some 
prefectures, these events also had considerable effect on the voting pattern 
01' peasants, their most popular leaders being in jail. 
However, local action continued in spite of increasing difl'icul ties, 
show'ing how strongly the needs and demands of the tenants were felt. Dore 
observed: 
"At the local level police ±'requently intervened in disputes, sometimes 
with an objective fair-mindedness which operated to the tenants' advantage, 
but generally there is no doubt that their powers were mobilised ,in the 
landlord's interest. Many disputes ended when exasperated peasants resorted 
to threats 01' violence which immediately brought police sanctions on their 
heads. Sobered into ,a shamefaced sense of their own presumptuous daring9 
they were soon reduced to a mood of compilliant submission. Police rights of 
arbi trary search - l'or subversive li tera ture - and, of arrest and questioning 
were regularly used as a means of intimidation, while associations which 
were deemed to have dangerous tendencies were ordered to be dissolved.,,30 
Leaders such as Yuzen Ishida still show the marks 01' torture to which 
they were subjected during their many imprisonments. 
Surprisingly enough, despite adverse conditions at national and 
local levels, the tenancy disputes waged by local unions, whether or not 
aU'iliated to Nichin6 or other organisations, decreased but little. This is 
perhaps an indication that the peasant movement had taken strong roots and 
was not easy to repress. 
The changes taking place in rural areas were all the more surprising 
since in addition to simple repression several other means were used to 
~9. For a description of the ups and downs of peasant organisations as 
political groups in these years see G.O.'rotten, The Sooial Democratic 
Movement ••• , op.cit., p. 345 ff. 
30. R. P. Dore, op. ci t ., p. e4. 
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oppose, oontrol or neutralise tenant aotions. Landlords formed their own 
unions, whtoh inoreased rapidly during the seoond half of' the 19~Os, to 
ooordinate aotivities against tenant demands. (see Table 1). 
Peasant unions whioh urged radioal ohange in the rural sooial 
struoture had the wind taken out of their sails by "oonoiliation unions", 
generally oreated by landlords or the polioe whenever a oonfliot threatened. 
Some ooncessions ware made, landlords of'ten betng persuaded to do so by the 
Looal authorities, and tenants and landlords were brought together in one 
organisation. As shown by Table 1, the number of oonciliation unions grew 
and by 1934 inoluded almost as many members as the tenant unions. 31 
In this oontext, it should be emphasised again that in Japan the 
tradition of .harmonious relationships, oonoiliation and compromise is 
strongly embedded. Moreover, in many areas the oontrast between landlords 
and tenants was not sharpo Numerous tenants were also part-owners and many 
landlords had relatively small estates. This is shown by the many landlords 
who were involved in the disputes, averaging about 1 to every 4 tenants and 
also contributed to the fre~uenoy of oonoiliatory solutions. To ~uote Dore 
again: 
" ••• in the olose oommunity organisation of the geQgraphically oonoentrated 
hamlet, with all its meohanisms of gift-giving and labour exohange to 
maintain harmonious relations, the familistio atmosphere made open confliot 
truly internecine and for that reason emotionally difficult to support. 
To the tenant born and bred in such a community, neighbourhood ties 
inevitably took precedence over olass ties."32 
Only in areas where large landownings were more fre~uent, landlords 
having tens or even hundreds of tenants, as in the prefectures of Niigata 
and Yamagata, did the oonfliot between landlords and tenants have overtones 
of class struggLe and the leftist wing of Niohin6 maintained its strongholds. 
Leftist politioal aotion in the rural areas, emphasising class 
struggle and r~dical solutions to tenant problems, beoame increaSingly 
difficult after 19~~ and partioularly after 1931. In September 1931 the 
Manchuria inoident took plaoe: an explosion engineered by the Armed Forces 
near Mukden arid used as a pretext for the ocoupation of' Manohuria. This 
aotion oonsiderably inoreased the authoritarian tendenoy of the Japanese 
31. G.O.Totten, "Labour and Agrarian Disputes.u", op.cit., p. 206. 
3~. R.P.Dore, op.cit., p. 79. 
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.government and ·the influence of the Armed Forces. It was noted for the 
perHm 1Y32;;;;; 37T··· 
"On the domestic scene, this was the period of 'government by assassination', 
during which the military, supported by like-minded civilians and 
chauvinistic organisations, steadily encroached on all areas of government 
at the expense of the moderates, the political parties and the press ••• "33 
The peasant unions as national or prefectural organisations were 
also aft'ected. At the local level, tenant action against landlords :t'or more ~ 
favourable conditions continued, but at the national level the emphasis was 
laid !lIore strongly on the demand for a greater share in the distribution of 
the national income :t'or agriculture as a whoilie, for landowners as well as 
tenants. As Dore noted, the moderate leaders who remained after the 
radical peasant leaders had disappeared ••• 
"were mdre inclined :for reasons of ideology as well as of expediency to 
shift emphasis from tenant demands to farmer demands, which had the support 
also of the army and could claim as their justification not the promptings 
of alien ideologies but the need to preserve the integrity of the 
countryside as the guardian of truly Japanese virtues.,,34 
Another trend that came up in these years, and that was directly 
related to the Manchuria Incident and the growing influence of tlle military, 
was the revival of patriotic unity and the emphasis of truly Japanese 
values. 
However, the tendency to emphasise the common interests of all 
.people engaged in :t'arming was partly a consequence of' the economic 
depression of the early 1930s. The government undertook certain measures 
to stabilise rice prices~ In order to tackle in part the rapidly growing 
problem of indebtedness, a Debt Clearance Unions Law was enacted in 1933 
and the formation of special unions to help poor :farmers clear their debts 
was stimulated. This law gave local authorities responsible for its 
execution considerable control over the lives of the peasants involved. The 
village self~help movement or Village Rehabilitation Movement, started in 
-J)I 3~, was another means through whioh to bring rural people into line with 
national policies. Agricultural Cooperatives were strengthened and regulated 
to make partioipation more attractive to poor peasants and at the same time 
were used as a means to mobilise the produ~iive capacity of the rural 
33. John M.Maki, Government and Politics in Japan (London, 1962), p. 25. 
34. Ronald P.Dore, "The Socialist Party and the Farmers" in Allan B.Cole, 
George U.Totten and Cecil H.Uehara, SOCialist Parties in Postwar Ja an 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966 , Ch. 11, p. 371. 
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population. Sentimental appeals to the glorifioation of the Japanese 
.Feasant I s Soul were part of this prooess whioh Dore oalled "the totalitarian 
solution".35 Summarising he noted: 
"By and large ·the result of all these administrative innovations was to 
strengthen the old landlord-dominated order of the villages. It was the 
landlords, or in their absenoe the more prosperous owner-i'armers, who 
dominated the Co-operatives and the new Rehabilitation Committees as they 36 
dominated the Agricultural Assooiations and the Village Counoils already." 
It is striking that in spite of all these measures the number of 
disputes continued to increase. Most tenancy disputes were now apparently 
waged by local buraku groups, independent of any direct support by a 
national peasant or political organisation. Statistics collected i'or the 
years in which the broader organisations suffered severe repression sho~ 
this clearly. Of the 3,41Sl disputes reported in 1931, only 1,414 were 
sponsored by any national peasant or political organisation; in 193~ it was 
'l,c6/j out oi' 3,414, and in 1935 only 1,351 outoi' 6,/j~4,3'{ indicating that 
peasants in many areas were aoting on their own behalf' without any political 
support. Not until the war against China started in 1937 did the number of 
disputes start to decline; however, despite the dissolution of all peasant 
unions in 1939, 3,30/j disputes were reported in 194103/j 
This shows how serious the land tenure situation was and makes it 
understandable that efforts to propose reform legislation were on many 
occasions undertaken by the more enlightened politioians, albeit in vain. It 
prepare4 the way before and during World War II for the land reform finally 
carried out in 1946. As Dore noted: 
"The unions' activity, their suocess in formalising the lines of confli It 
ancl bringing it into the open, contri bu ted to a growing awareness of the 
'problem of the villages
' 
which eventually prompted the Ministry of 
Agriculture officials to draft a comprehensive land reform at a time when 
35. 
36. 
For a detailed description of this period 
Jap~n, op.cit., Ch. IV, "The Totalitarian 
I 
Ibid., p. 104. 
-...,-
see R.P.Dore, Land Reform in 
Solution". 
37. N6cq.i-Seido Shiry6 Shusei Hensan Iinkai (Editorial Committee for the 
Col~ection of Material on the Land System), N6ohi-Seido Shi;r6 Shusei 
(Co~lection of Material on the Land System), Vol. II (Materials ooncerning 
·Tenant Disputes), (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shob6, 1969), pp. 362-65. 
I 
38. R.pJDore, op.cit., p. 72. 
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they could still believe that Japan would. win thelvar against America, not-
lose it in total and paralysing defeat,,"39 
The disposition of some government circles toward land reform came 
out in a plan drafted by a section of the Ministry of Agriculture in 1942. 
'rhis advocated the redistribution of 1,918,000 hectares of land over a " 
period of 25 years in order to transform tenants into owner-cultivators. 40 
However, this plan did not become official policy. 
In the following years, hov,ever, some independent and relatively 
isolated local reform movements took place in large landowner-dominated 
areas. In 1942-43, in Niigata prefecture where the radical agrarian 
movement had its main stronghold, particularly in the Naka-Kambara county, 
landlords had to give in to tenant pressures to sell their lando Niigata, 
an important rice producing area, was crucial for the country's food supply 
and the government, intent on getting maximum rice production, was willing 
to support the demands of those who actually farmed the land against those 
who only received the rents. Many pre-war union leaders were active in 
their burakus in this respect, although the unions as such had officially dis-
appeared. On the whole, the sales were not favourable to the landlords, 
since they had to deposit their receipts in the Industrial Cooperative in 
their village; at that time, this was a means through which the government 
controlled agricultural activities. 41 
The war effort brought complete control from above of all activities 
in the rural areas, organised particularly through the system of Industrial 
(agricultural) Cooperatives reformed to this effect in 1943 and renamed 
"Agricultural Associations". The system of landlord-dominated agricultural 
cooperatives that had existed uhder different names and legislative 
regulations since about 1900 was thus brought under complete government 
control. Membership was obligatory for all farmers. A principal function 
was the compulsory collection and storage of rice for the government's food 
supply programme. 
After the dissolution of peasant unions in 1939, a Federation for 
the reform of the Land System was created by the social-democrat, R.Hirano. 
39. R.P.Dore, "On Learning to Live with the Second Best", Economic a.nd 
Political Weekly, Bombay, November 8, 1969, p. 1783. 
40. T.Furushima, Nemp6 N6~6 Hyakunen (A Century of Agriculture), 
Chronological Tables Tokyo, 1967), pp. 51-52" 
41. Information supplied by Prof.T.Furushima who did field work in Niigata 
in 1946. 
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This Federation pretended not to be a olass organisation and remained active 
until 1942, when it was also dissolved. After that year, praotioally no 
organisations were left to defend peasant interests. The only representation 
was through the 13 members of the Diet lifho, with oertain seotions of the 
Ministry of Agrioulture, oontinued to press for improvement of land tenure 
legislation. After 1942, some of these Diet members, inoluding Hirano, 
maintained olande stine oontaot with looal peasan'l; groups that formerly 
belonged to the federations. As Diet members they were in oontaot with 
their eleotorate, although meetings and publications were forbidden and 
looal groups leaders were often arrested. The numbers of tenanoy disputes in 
those years were not offioially reported, but were probably the same as in 
earlier years. 42 
Immediately after the war, efforts were undertaken to reorganise 
the Sooialist Party and the former Nichino peasant unions related to it. 
These efforts were faoiliated by the fact that organisations at the buraku 
level had not been entirely stamped out, despite government repression. 
Former leaders, some returning from prison, others from work in outlying 
areas related to the Japanese war effort or oooupation, found their one-time 
followers ready to be re-aotivated. En masse bargaining with landlords 
over rent reduotion and other problems was onoe again the order of the day. 
After the left-wing political parties had been reorganised, the 
Japanese Peasant Union (Niohino) was re-formed on February 9, 1946 with 
Sooialists, Sooial-Demoorats and Communists working together in the new 
organisation. The most orucial issue to be taokled was the pending land 
reform. 
In 1938 an Agrioultural Land Adjustment Law had been passed by the 
Diet, partly under pressure of the many tenanoy disputes. On Deoember 4, 
1945 a Revision of the Agricultural Land Adjustment Law was presented to 
the Diet" proposing that within five years about i ,500,000 heotares of land 
be transferred to owner-farmers, inoluding all tenanted land of absentee 
landowners and part of the land of resident landowners. The latter were to 
be allowed to hold' 5 oho of tenanted land. 43 This Revision was passed by 
. -
the Diet but was oonsidered inadequate by many oiroles, and failed to 
obtain the approval of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). 
The stipulation that tenanted land. would be affected caused many landlords, 
42. Information supplied by Mr. R.Hirano in an interview, July 1970 .. 
43. 1 oh9 = 009917 hectare. 
- 21 -
rosident or absentee, to try to get rid of their tenants and to take back 
tenanted lands. 250,000 such cases were estimated to have taken piace 
bet~eGn August 1945 and May 1946. Problems arising around.this issue had 
adverse effects on food supplies to the cities, with the result that on 
1) May 1946 a Foodstuff M~day was organised in Tokyo, at which 300,000 
people demonstrated in front of the Imperial P[,lace. 44 
On 9 December, 1945 the General Headquarters of the Allied Forces 
issued a strong memorandum in favour of radical chango in the rural areas, 
including land reform, and giving 15 March, 1946 as t1 deadline to the 
Japanese government for the presentation of an appropria,·te plan. The new 
plan proposed lowering the ceiling for resident landowners' holdings to 
3 cho. Again, this was not considered sufficient by the SCAP. Finally, on 
October 21, 1946 the Owner-Farmer Establishment Special Measures Law and the 
Revised Agricultural Land Adjustment Law were promulgated, limittng the 
amount of tenanted land that a landowner could maintain to one cho. 45 This 
enabled drastic restructuring of Japanese rural society, practically 
eliminating the overwhelming power and influence of the landlords. 
Former and radical peasant union leaders as well as goverment 
officials admit that the land reform programme as it was finally executed 
was in large part the result of pressure by GHQ. It is also recognised that 
GHQ support enabled the rapid revival of the peasant organisations which also 
pressured for the reform. The campaign to revive the-former tenant unions 
spread rapidly and by 1941 the Nichin6 had about 1,210',000 members organised 
throughout the country.46 
In the post-war years, pressure exercised by the peasant organisations 
was particularly felt in relation to implementation of the land reform. As 
we have noted, when the first official steps regarding possible land reform 
were taken, the landlords started to evict tenants from their land in order 
to diminish the number of hectares that they would have to sell to the 
government for transfer to tenants. In defence against such actions, tenants 
organised en masse negotiations. This was not easy as the local police 
generally favoured the landlordso41 There were also the traditional 
440 Masaru Kajita, Land Reform in Japan (Agricultural Development Series, 
No.2, Tokyo, 1959), pp. 28-30. 
45. ~. 
46. Ibid. 
47. Interview with Mr.T.Matsuzawa, Diet member and representative from 
Niigata prefecture. 
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psychological barriers against opposing the landlord's desire. As Dore 
noted: 
"Tenants conditioned to listen to their landlord's instructions with 
respectful bows could not easily make the psychological break with their 
past which an outright refusal to return the land would require. Moreover, 
self-preservation often dictated compliance. Many depended on the landlord's 
permission t'o cut firewood and green fertilizer from his forest land. 
Reliance on the landlord's benevolence in times of acute economic distress 
was the only form of social security many tenants knew. Such a source of 
actual and potential benefits could not easily by offended, particularly 
in the uncertainties of the early stages of the reform when peasants, 
congeni tally scep,tical of all the actions of authority, could never be.~sure 
that today's law which promised to turn them into owner-farmers might not 
be replaced by a new one tomorrow which threatened to make them tenants 
again. "48 
The strength of the landlords' influence can be estimated from the 
fact that, of 250,000 cases in which landlords tried to reclaim land from 
tenants, only 23,000 were disputed. To give some form of protection to the 
tenants, land reform legislation provided that the approval of the 
, . 
Agrioultural Land Committee was needed for the return of tenanted land to 
. the owner. These Committees were established in each village and town 
(municipality) as part of the 1938 Agrioultural Land Adjustment Law, with 
members nominated by the prefectural governor. The Revised Agricultural 
Land Adjustment Law of October 1946 stipulated that these committees should 
be elected and consist of 3 landowner representatives, 2 owner-farmer 
representatives and 5 tenant representatives. Peasant organisations played a 
particularly important role in the constitution of these village committees. 
Where peasants had strong and militant organisations, tenant representatives 
could be elected who would not merely conform to the traditional pattern of 
landlord rule~ In a good many cases, the important position of committee 
president was filled by a tenant if the tenant representatives as a group 
within the committee were well-coordinated and not too easily intimidated. 
The role of the Agricultural Land Committees was crucial in the land 
reform process. Several conflicts of interest between landlords and tenants 
regarding the land reform process had to be decided by the Land Committees; 
for that reason, it was important whether such committees were tenant or 
landlord-dominated. As Dore observed: 
"Control over eviction was the touchstone of a Land Committee's efficienoy. 
Where it was loose other abuses generally followed. Landlords who could 
use the threat of eviction freely were able to exaot high black~market 
payments from the tenants whom they 'allowed' to enjoy the benefits of the 
law. Even if eviction was kept within limits, where landlord-dominated 
Committees allowed landlords freely to choose which plots of land they would 
48. R.P.Dore, Land Reform in Japan, op.cit., p. 151. 
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retain as their 1 cho allotment, the same effeot could be.aohieved. In 
tenant-domi.nated Commi ttees~ on the other hand, landlords who attempted 
such blandishments were given short shrift."49 
The whole reform effort had an important mobilising function in the 
rural areas, as one field observer noted: 
"The m~thod by which the land reform programme was carried out constitutes. 
an important adult educational programme, perhaps one of the most significant 
adult educational efforts ever launched. The purchases and resales of the 
land were made by village commissions -- nearly 10,600 generally inqependent 
and highly responsible groups of 10 members eaoh. Half of the members of 
each commission were farm tenants."50 
Initially, before the new land reform law beoame effeotive, the 
Land Committees were constituted without proper elections. The fact that 
administrative villages, at which level the Land Committees had to be 
cr.xeated, often consisted of ten or even more burakus (hamlets), oomplicated 
the constitution of the committees sinoe each buraku wanted to be represented. 
Considerable negotiation between the buvakus and the landlords, owner-
farmers am tenants was necessary to make up the committee. Where peasants 
were well-organised they could be sure of getting committee members to 
represent their interests. In other cases, traditional buraku IIbosses", 
often landlords, would dominate. 51 
Chances for appropriate tenant representation improved after 
elections of Municipal (village) Agricultural Land Committees were held in 
conformity with the land reform law in 1947. However, in only a few 
prefectures was the number of tenant chairmen of committees larger than the 
number of landlord chairmen. In 32 out of 46 prefectures, committee 
chairmen were predominantly landlords, in 8 prefectures they were 
predominantly owher-farmers and in only 6 prefectures had tenants the 
highest number of chairmenshipso In the countr,y as a whole, 24.8 percent 
of the chairmen of Agricultural Land Committees were tenants, 39.1 percent 
were landlords and 34.5 percent owner-farmers, the rest being independent 
49. ~., p. 153. 
50. Arthur F.Raper, "Some Recent Changes in Japanese Village Life", Rural 
Sociology, 16, No.1, March 1951, p. 12. 
51. Nochi Kaikaku Kiroku Iinkai (Committee to Record the Rural Land Reform): 
NochiKaikaku Tenmatsu Gailo (Outline of the Results of Rural Land 
Reform), Tokyo, p. 5100 
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outsiders. 52 
Landlord influence thus continued to be strong, even in prefeotures 
where tenants we~e well-organised, perhaps due to the fact that buraku loyalty 
was often stronger than olass loyalty. As we have mentioned, however, most 
landlords .were not really large landholders, almost 75 percent of those 
who were Municipal Agricultural Land Committee members owning less than 5 
hectares.: 3 
Another indication of the soarcity of large landowners was that during 
the whole land reform process only 1,000 had to sell more than 50 hectares 
of the 2,062,000 affected. By August 1, 1950 a total· of 1,742,000 hectares 
of cultivated lahd had been purohased from their previous owners and 
transferred to 4,478,000 tenants or owner-tenantsG54 
In the overall reform prooess up to 1949, about 560,000 cases arose 
in which landlords demanded the return of part of their land so that it would 
not be affected by the reform. Of these, 147,000 were disputed; little more 
than half not being granted to the landlords; 25 peroent were solved in a 
way whioh gave satisfaction to both parties and the rest were awarded to the 
landlords. 55 There was increasing pressure to dispute landlord demands in 
the period when peasant unions were gaining strength. Prior to May 1946 
only 10 percent of demands for repossession of land were disputed. 
On the whole, the traditional Japanese approaoh of seeking compromise 
and harmony seemed to prevail onoe the reform maohinery, set in motion by 
the SCAP, properly functioned. There was but little olass struggle. As 
Dare noted: 
"The 'tenants-first' view, or what might also be oalled the 'class view' of 
the land reform, was that which ooloured the attitude of the. Oocupation and 
also of the leftwing politioal parties, the farmers v unions, and the left-
wing aoademic writers who frequehtly deplored the extent of tenant dis-
possession. But it was not the predominant one in the villages. In all 
aspects of the reform, hamlet solidarity, with its generally hierarohioal 
52. Agrioultural Land Department, Sanko Shiryo (Referenoe Materials), 
Ministry of Agrioulture and Forestry, Nov. 1947, mimeo., Table 9, p. 14. 
53. Noohi Kaik~u eto., op.oit., p. 513. 
54. T.Ogura, rarian Problems and (Tokyo: 
The Institute of Asian Economio Affairs, 
55. R.P.Dore, Land Reform in Japan,op.cite, 
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pattern and its traditional emphasis on the harmony of the ham3.et, operated 
to clog, or if one prefers to lubricate, the process of transferring the 
lancl from owner to cuI ti vatoro 1156 
iAlmost no violence occurred during the reforme During negotiations 
and the reaching of final comprorrdses at the local level, peasants and others I" 
gained valuable experiences 
liThe purchase and resale of the land was a tedious e.nd involved transaotion. 
In one 'village, characterized .bY longtime paddy farrrdng, '!"l,000 pieces of 
land were involved; in another, 4,000; and in another, 29000. 
A number of people in addition to the tenant members of the commissions 
received valuable on-the-gTound adult leadership @xperience 9 including the 
cle~ks who prepared the transactions for the commission's consideration and 
the buraku representative who often worked out the details of purchase and 
resale in his locali tyo Ivi th an average of at least three clerks per 
commisEjion and not less than a half dozen buraku representatives, it means:· 
that 15 to 20 men in each village -- a nation.al total of 150,000. to 200,000 
had palticipated in this uniQue leadership experienoe, and that about a third 
of these were from the farm-tenant group who in the old tenure system could 
. hardly ,have hoped to perform as leaders. So, Quite a.side from the benefits 
which t:he new owners secured from the land pUrohased, the way the transfers 
were carried out has in a short ti~, produoed a sizable group of potentiai 
new leaders in Japanese villages." 
It is not surprising that as many as 25 peroent of It;l,ndlords' demands 
for re~ossession were disputed" As the oase studies presented. by Dore 
indicate, this is probably due to the support of the growing peasant unions 
whioh had an important educational funotion. 
Japanese Peasant Union leaders have emphasised that one of their main 
tasks ~fter the War was to guide tenants in defending their interests through 
the Agricultural Land Committees. 58 Particularly around the generally 
recogni;sed demand for effeotive land reform, the peasant union movement was 
united ,and could show oonsiderable force. 
the 
!Later, other issues divided the ranks of the unions~ particularly in 
: 
case of government food requisitioning. The Sooialist Party, which 
I depend~d heavily oh peasant support, critioised this polioy whioh, in 
.,' 
, 
several cases, left the farmer with insuffioient rice for his own family. I 
On the other hand, the urban electorate, anxious to get as much rioe as 
I 
possible at the cheapest prioea, favoured the government policy. At the 
56. ~o, p.166. 
57. Arthur F.Raper, op.oit., po 13. 
58. Interviews with several union leaders. 
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Second Convention of Nichin6 in February 1947, controversy over this issue 
was strong and a group headed by R.Hirano and considered lihe right wiil:g of 
Nichin6, split off. Later, when the Sooialist Party tried to head a 
coalition government, the Communist wing of Niohin6 became more and more 
I 
critical; since the Socialist leaders were tied to government polioies, the 
Communists won increasing support from local groups. Soon, however, the 
factional struggle within the Nichin6 and the several leftist parties oaused 
the majori ty of members to beoome indifferent. The main reason for :this', 
however, was that the issues that oaused peasant protest right after the 
war had been gradually solved. As Dore noted: 
"Many of the immediate postwar leaders of looal fa~'mers a union branches --
and this was a potent factor in the union's deoline -- had by then been 
eleoted to positions of administrative responsibility in land oommittees and 
village I assemblies and had lost interest in the mere organisation of 
movements of protest. Moreover, the immediate issues whioh had provided 
a power+ul impetus to the organisation of looal 'struggles' had lost some 
of their urgenoy. With an eaSing of the food situation, the government's 
requisitioning programme began to press less heavily on the farmer; smaller 
delivery quotas were imposed for the harvest of 1948 than for the year 
before, ;despite a oonsiderably larger yield. By the end of 1948 the land 
reform progI'amme was well under way. Landlords v efforts to repossess land 
as an attempt to evade the reform were largely an immediate postwar 
phenomenon whioh had later oeased to provide a common motif for struggles. 
The demands for demooratisation of the agrioultural assooiations had been 
answered with the establishment of a new system of agrioultural 
oooperatives. Only demonstrations against heavy tax assessments remained 
as the chief staple of looal aotivity. ,,59 
I 
It seems that, while during the pre-war and immediate post-war years 
! 
the grassroot peasant organisations showed oonsiderable aotivity in 
relation to strongly felt local issues, the national level organisation 
i 
suffered setbaoks because of government repression; after 1948, the national 
level organisation remained politically active but the base organisations 
lost int,erest. Once looally felt problems and grievanoes had been solved 
i 
or were, ~n the course of being solved, it became difficult to mobilise the 
peasants for protest or other political action. In fact, they were 
gradually transformed into IIfarmers".60 
59. In Allan B.Cole, George Ok['otten and Cecil H.Uyehara, op.cit., p. 386. 
60. In a personal communication, Prof.Dore indicated that after the War it 
became increaSingly appropriate to translate the name of Nichino, Nihon 
Nomin Kumiai, as Japanese Farmers' Union as G.O.Totten generally does, 
while before the war Japanese Peasants' Union was more to the point. 
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WhElr.!, more tllCl.!), 4,Q_Q_Q,_OQ(Lt~r.!,sjJit§_ l:tag. __ bEl_El.r.!, t:r;a!),sf9_:rmed into small 
owners and government rioe requisitioning became l~ss severe, the on'ly issue 
left to pre-ocoupy the farIFa:'s was that of control of rice prices. Although 
the lifiqhin6 and some smaller farmers v organisations, applied political 
pressure at the national level for a rice price favourable to the farmers, 
it was particularly the Central Union of Agrioultural Cooperatives' whiph' 
tried to protect farmers' interests in this respect. This Union succeeded 
the Industrial Cooperatives and Agricultural Associations whioh existed 
I 
prior and during the War and were re-structured along more democratic lines 
in 1947. Rice-marketing had been traditionally a main function of this 
organisation, on which it depended heavily for its income; defence of tp,e 
rioe price thus became naturally one of its tasks. Political divisions and 
the lack of strongly felt needs or issues around which to rally the farmers 
were the main reasons for the declining influence of farmer unions after 
I 
1950. 61 
Concluding remarks 
In comparison with organisations in other countries, 'peasant organisations as 
they developed in Japan have some outstanding characteristios. 
(1) They were initiated in areas in which the modernising influence of 
growing cities and industry was strong. When developments resulting 
from this influence proved disadvantageous to the peasants, or left 
their growing expectations unfulfilled, the willingness to organise to 
defend their own interests became strong. 
(2) The Japanese organisations were led or even initiated by non-peasants 
or by peasants who had had ample experience as industrial workers in 
the big cities. At the stage when the movement spread and took on 
regional or national proportions, intelleotual support and leadership 
became,crucial. 
(3) An important obstacle was the paternalistic control through emotional 
ties and patronage of landlords over tenants. This was overcome when 
organisation leaders were able to take up a similar role, inspiring 
some admiration and loyalty among the peasants • 
. 61. Information supplied by Dr. N.Imamura and interviews with several 
c:ooperati ve directors. 
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(4) Organisations were not built up around overall issues such as land reform 
but around concrete grievcmces and demands that were strongly felt at 
the local level. If these demands were not sufficiently fulfilled.and 
the tenants strengthened their organisation, more radical means of 
struggle were applied such as mass demonstrations, sit-ins, strikes, 
action against strike breakers, en-masse cultivation of unwilling 
landlords' land, etc. With the··growing strength of peasant organisations, 
broader issues such·as improvement of legislation protecting tenants' 
rights, better overall tenancy rates and land reform9 were taken up as 
demands.. A similar process of escalating the means of struggle as well 
. 62 
as the demands has been noted in peasant movements elsewhere. 
620 Occasional Papers on peasant organisations in the Philippines and 
Indonesia are under preparation by the author. 
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